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"THIS IS LIKE DEJA VU ALL OVER AGAIN"1 : THE
THIRD, CONSTITUTIONAL, ATTACK ON THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF POLICE LABORATORY REPORTS
IN CRIMINAL CASES
EDWARD J. IMVINKELRIED*
Some commentators have asserted that in the United States, trial by jury is
becoming trial by expert.2 A survey conducted in the 1970s found that a third of the
cases of the responding attorneys involved scientific evidence.' In contrast, a report
of California jury trials found that 86 percent of trials in the early 1990s involved
expert testimony.4
The high incidence of the use of expert testimony in criminal trials can place a
severe strain on the resources of police laboratories. Many laboratories are already
understaffed, and crime laboratory technicians have heavy workloads.5 To relieve
that strain, prosecutors often attempt to introduce the technician's report without
calling the technician to give live testimony. In some jurisdictions, state statutes
permit the prosecutor to use an affidavit to lay the foundation for the report and
completely dispense with live testimony.6 In other cases, rather than calling the
technician and forcing the technician to spend time away from the laboratory, the
prosecutor presents the testimony of a laboratory supervisor to establish the
foundation for the report.7
In 1912 the United States Supreme Court stated in dictum that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause prohibited the prosecution from introducing an autopsy
report "without the consent of the accused.",8 Given that dictum, it was predictable
that the criminal defense bar would resist prosecution efforts to introduce police
laboratory reports without the sponsoring testimony of the technician who authored
the report. Over the years the defense bar has mounted three waves of attacks on the
admissibility of such reports.
The first wave consisted of arguments that police laboratory reports do not fall
within the common-law hearsay exceptions for business entries and official
records.9 In particular, defense attorneys argued that the trustworthiness of police
laboratory reports is suspect because they are prepared with a view to litigation. °
* Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Professor of Law, University of California, Davis; former chair, Evidence
Section, American Association of Law Schools; co-author, PAUL C. GiANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED,
SCIENTIFIC EvIDENcE (4th ed. 2007).
1. Things People Said: Yogi Berra Quotes, http://www.rinkworks.com/said/yogiberra.shtml (last visited
Apr. 27, 2008).
2. See, e.g., William T. Pizzi, Expert Testimony in the U.S., 145 NEW LJ.82 (1995).
3. Oliver Schroeder, Jr., A Legal Study Concerningthe ForensicSciences Personnel,in 3 ASSESSMENT
OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCES PERSONNEL 19 (1977), cited in Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Laboratory
Reports in CriminalTrials: The Reliability of Scientific Proof,49 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 672 n.7 (1988).
4. SAMUEL R. GROSS, SOME DATA ON THE USE OF EXPERT ,WITNESSESINCALIFORNIA CIvIL TRIALS
(1990), cited in Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REv. 1113, 1119 n. 18.
5. Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Science and Capital Punishment Reform: An "Intellectually Honest"
Assessment, 17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 299, 306-14 (2007); see Crime Labs Received an Estimated 2.7
Million Cases in 2005, http:llwww.ojp.usdoj.govlbjslpub/presslcpffsl05pr.htm.
6. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.1934(5) (1996).
7. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 932 A.2d 1261 (Pa. 2007).
8. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 450 (1912).
9. See generally Edward J. lmwinkelried, The Constitutionalityof Introducing Evaluative Laboratory
Reports Against CriminalDefendants, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 624-26 (1979).

10. Id. at 628.
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While these arguments gained somejudicial adherents," the clear majority of courts
rejected these attacks. 2 In doing so, the courts invoked a variety of rationales: The
forensic analyst's determination is intrinsically neutral and could just as easily
exculpate as inculpate;' 3 the technician is a scientist, not a law enforcement
official;' 4 the analyst's finding is objective, approximating the reporting of a fact;' 5
requiring the technician's court appearance for cross-examination would serve little
purpose because it is unlikely that the technician will remember the specific test
described in the report;' 6 and, such a requirement would impose an undue burden
on police laboratory staffs. 7
The second wave of attacks was led by a statutory argument based on the
wording of a number of provisions in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 8 The Federal
Rules of Evidence took effect in 197519 and, importantly, forty-one states followed
suit by adopting evidence codes patterned more or less directly after the Federal
Rules.2" While Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence sets out a version of
the business entry hearsay exception, l Rule 803(8) codifies the official record
hearsay exception.22 The text of Rule 803(8)(B) reads that in a criminal case the
prosecution may not offer reports of "matters observed by police officers and other
law enforcement personnel. 2 3 Subsection 8(C) adds that in a criminal case the
prosecution may not offer "findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant
to authority granted by law."2 4 In a 1977 decision interpreting Rule 803(8), United

11. Id. (citing State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d 117 (Tenn. 1977); State v. Rhone, 555 S.W.2d 839 (Mo.
1977)).
12. Id. at 629. See also United States v. Parker, 491 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1973); Hardy v. State, 297 So. 2d
399 (Ala. Crim. App. 1974); Seals v. State, 213 So. 2d 645 (Ala. 1968); State v. Reardon, 376 A.2d 65 (Conn.
1977); State v. Forbes, 310 So. 2d 569 (La. 1975); State v. Snider, 541 P.2d 1204 (Mont. 1975); People v. Porter,
362 N.Y.S.2d 249 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974); Thomas v. State, 493 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); State v.
Kreck, 542 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1975).
13. Imwinkelreid, supranote 9, at 629.
14. id.
15. Id. at 627-28.
16. Id. at 644.
17. Id. at 643.
18. See generally Giannelli, supra note 3, at 675-85.
19. RONALD L CARLSON, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EDWARD J. KIONKA & K.RISTNE STRACHAN,
EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 20 (6th ed. 2007).
20. Id. at 21.
21. FED. R. EviD. 803(6). In pertinent part, Rule 803(6) reads:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions,
opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if
it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or
data compilation.
22. Id. at 803(8). Rule 803(8) reads:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies,
setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty
imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal
cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil
actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting
from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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States v. Oates,25 the Court made a number of controversial rulings, in part to moot
any concerns that the statutory provisions ran afoul of the Confrontation Clause.
The Court held that: A crime laboratory technician is "law enforcement personnel"
under 803(8)(B); the technician's determination is a "finding[]" under 803(8)(C);
and, to prevent the prosecution from evading those restrictions, laboratory reports
inadmissible under 803(8) must also be excluded under 803(6).26
However, just as most courts rejected the common-law attacks on the
introduction of crime laboratory reports, others have brushed aside the statutory
attack. A number of published opinions reject the Oates court's reading of Rules
803(6) and (8).27 These opinions apply the statutory restrictions only to police
reports of "adversary" confrontations such as arrests and lineups.28 Reading these
opinions creates a sense of d6jA vu because the courts reprise many of the same
rationales used as the basis for rejecting the common-law attacks: The expert's
determination is intrinsically neutral;2 1 the technician is a scientist, not an advocate
for the prosecution;3 ° and, the technician's conclusion is trustworthy because it is
in the nature of an objective fact."
We are now witnessing the third wave of attacks on the admissibility of police
laboratory reports. In 2004 the Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision,
Crawford v. Washington.32 The Crawford Court overturned its 1980 precedent,
Ohio v. Roberts,33 which had announced that the Confrontation Clause countenanced the introduction of prosecution hearsay so long as the testimony was
reliable. More specifically, the testimony was deemed sufficiently reliable if the
testimony fell "within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or bore "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness." ' In Crawford, writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia repudiated that mode of analysis.
Revisiting the history of the Confrontation Clause, Justice Scalia concluded that
the core concern inspiring the Confrontation Clause was the Founding Fathers'
abhorrence of the civil law practice of admitting testimony that has not been
"subject to adversarial testing" by cross-examination.35 The Clause targets
"testimonial" hearsay. 36 The Justice wrote:

25. 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
26. Id. at 67-80.
27.

1 PAUL C. GIANNELI

& EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ScIENTIc EVIDENCE § 6.02[b] (4th ed. 2007);

Giannelli, supra note 3, at 676, 679. Courts have rejected the Oates approach as an unduly broad reading of the
legislative history materials. For example, in United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789,793 (9th Cir. 1979), the court

reviewed some of the same material relied on by Oates but concluded that those materials manifest a special
concern for adversary confrontations "at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant." Id. at 793
(quoting S. Rep. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 7051,

7064). See also State v. Smith, 323 S.E.2d 316, 327 (N.C. 1984).
28. Giannelli, supra note 3 at 679.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 677, 679.
32. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). For an analysis of Crawford'seffects, see Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence
and the ConfrontationClause After Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L.& POL'Y 791 (2007).
33. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
34. Id. at 66.
35. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.
36. Id. at 51.
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Various formulations of this core class of "testimonial" statements exist: "ex
parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable
to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially"; "extrajudicial statements.. .contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony,
or confessions"; "statements that were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial."37
If a hearsay statement is "testimonial," the prosecution may not introduce the
evidence unless the accused had a prior opportunity to question the declarant and
the declarant is unavailable at the time of trial. However, the Justice cautioned that
"[m]ost of the hearsay exceptions [invoked in prior Court precedents to justify the
admission of prosecution hearsay] covered statements that by their nature were not
testimonial-for example, business records. 38
Predictably, Crawfordtriggered this third, constitutional, wave of attacks on the
admissibility of police laboratory reports in criminal cases. As Yogi Berra would
say, "This is like d6j vu all over again. '"" In the case of the common-law and
statutory attacks, the courts are once again badly split, as Part II of this article
explains. Some courts reason that the crime laboratory technician reasonably
understands that he or she is producing a report to be used prosecutorially. Other
courts counter that the laboratory report qualifies as the type of business record that
Justice Scalia classified as nontestimonial. Moreover, as Part II demonstrates, the
courts rejecting the constitutional attack under Crawfordhave resurrected many of
the very same arguments that were invoked to brush aside the previous common-law
and statutory attacks. The courts are harking back to the arguments that: The
expert's determination is intrinsically neutral; the expert is an impartial scientist
rather than a law enforcement officer; the opinion is objective in nature; crossexamination would have little value; and, the opportunity to question the laboratory
supervisor satisfies any demands of the Confrontation Clause.
Recycling these arguments is an inadequate response to the new constitutional
attack on the admissibility of crime laboratory reports. Those arguments arguably
met the basic thrust of the common-law and statutory attacks on the reliability of
crime laboratory reports. However, post-Crawford, most of those arguments miss
the mark. Crawford ushers in a new era in which the constitutional analysis no
longer turns on the reliability of the prosecution hearsay.
Part I of this article reviews the Crawford line of authority, including the
Supreme Court's more recent decisions in Davis v. Washington,4° Whorton v.
Bockting,4 1and Missouri v. March.42 Part H describes the current split of authority
by surveying the lower court decisions applying Crawford to crime laboratory

37. Id. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted).
38. Id. at 56.
39. See Berra, supra note 1.
40. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
41. 127 S.Ct. 1173 (2007).
42. 128 S. Ct. 1441 (2007).
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reports. Part Ill is a critical evaluation of the extent, if any, to which Crawford
restricts the introduction of police laboratory reports. The article concludes that,
unlike the earlier common-law and statutory attacks, the latest, constitutional attack,
mandates the exclusion of a crime laboratory report finding that rests on the
analyst's application of an interpretive standard with a significant element of
subjectivity.
I. THE CRAWFORD LINE OF SUPREME COURT AUTHORITY
A. Crawford v. Washington (2004)
Michael Crawford was charged with stabbing Kenneth Lee.43 Crawford claimed
that before the stabbing, Lee had attempted to rape Crawford's wife, Sylvia.'
However, Crawford's denied that he acted out of anger or vengeance; rather, he
claimed self-defense.4 5 In particular, he asserted that he had seen Lee "'goin' for
something"' before he stabbed Lee.46 When the police learned of the stabbing, they
arrested both Michael and Sylvia. After receiving Miranda warnings, Sylvia gave
the police a tape-recorded statement.4 7 Her statement seemed to contradict
Michael's claim that there had been something in Lee's hand before Michael
stabbed him. 4 At trial, Michael invoked the state marital privilege, barring Sylvia

from testifying without his consent.4 9 The trial judge admitted
Sylvia's tape50
recorded statement as a declaration against penal interest.
In both the trial court and on appeal, Michael's defense counsel argued that the
admission of Sylvia's statement violated the Confrontation Clause. The trial judge
rejected the defense argument and asserted that Sylvia's statement was sufficiently
reliable to pass muster under Ohio v. Roberts.5 1 The trial judge emphasized that
Sylvia was an eyewitness with firsthand knowledge, she was recounting recent
events, and it did not appear that she was endeavoring to shift blame. After hearing
Sylvia's statement, the jury convicted Michael. The intermediate state appellate
court reversed because it disagreed with the trial judge's assessment of the
reliability of Sylvia's statement.52 However, the state supreme court concurred with
the trial judge and reinstated the conviction.53
As the introduction indicated, when the Crawford case reached the Supreme
Court, the majority used the case as a vehicle for fundamentally changing the
understanding of the Confrontation Clause. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
acknowledged that Roberts had been the controlling law for almost a quarter of a

43.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004).

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 38-40.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 38-40.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id.
Id. at41.
Id. at 41-42.
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century. However, he criticized the Roberts reliability test as "amorphous"54 and
"manipulable."" In his mind, the disagreement between the state intermediate and
supreme courts over the application
of the test to Sylvia's statement illustrated the
6
unpredictability of the test.
More importantly, Justice Scalia repudiated the reliability test because it was
inconsistent with the history of the Confrontation Clause. 7 The Justice marshaled
historical authorities and argued that the inspiration for the Clause was the
opposition of both English law and the Founding Fathers to "continental civil law"58
practices permitting the admission of hearsay testimony without crossexamination. In stark contrast, the "common-law tradition is one of live testimony
in court subject to adversarial testing."' The Justice recognized that in England
there had been deviations from the tradition; for a period, written records of pretrial
examinations conducted under the Marian bail and committal statutes had been
considered admissible. 6' However, the sharp backlash against the use of uncrossexamined testimony "in the great political trials of the 16th and 17th centuries,"62
notably the 1603 prosecution of Sir Walter Raleigh, 63 established the intensity of
the resistance to reliance on "written evidence"' in England. The records of the
debates over the Declarations of Rights in the various states demonstrated that the
same sentiment was widespread in America at the time of the Revolution.6 5
Justice Scalia noted that the "founding-era rhetoric decried...the civil-law mode
of' trial 66 and stated that at an American criminal trial, the Sixth Amendment
"prescribes" cross-examination as "a procedure for determining the reliability of'
the prosecution's testimony. 67 After this historical account, Justice Scalia concluded
that when a hearsay statement is "testimonial" in character, the Sixth Amendment
generally 68 demands that the statement be admitted only if the accused has had a
prior opportunity to question the declarant and the declarant is shown to be
unavailable to appear at trial.
Of course, in light of Crawford,the key issue becomes defining the category of
"testimonial" hearsay.69 Justice Scalia provided some insight into the meaning of
the term:

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

61.

Id. at 43-44.

61, 63.
68.
62-63.
63.
43.

62. Id. at 44.
63. Id. at 44-45.
64. Id. at 49.
65. Id. at 48-49.
66. Id. at 50.
67. Id. at 67.
68. In dictum, Justice Scalia stated that prior Supreme Court precedent suggested that there is an exception
for statements falling within the dying declaration hearsay exception. Id. at 56 n.6. However, he added that "[if
this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis." Id.
69. Id. at61.
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The text of the Confrontation Clause.. .applies to "witnesses" against the accused
-in other words, those who "bear testimony." "Testimony," in turn, is typically
"[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact." An accuser who makes a formal statement to government
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to
an acquaintance does not.7°
Justice Scalia then cited the various "formulations" previously mentioned in the
introduction to this article.7' Yet he stopped short of attempting to "spell out a
comprehensive definition" of the term "testimonial.""
B. Davis v. Washington (2006)
Since the Crawford Court declined to undertake the task of providing a
comprehensive definition of the term "testimonial," it was virtually inevitable that
the Court would have to revisit the issue. The Court did so in Davis v.
Washington,73 a 2006 decision. The opinion applied the Crawforddoctrine to two
fact situations: Davis, a Washington case involving statements made to a 911
emergency operator, 74 and Hammon, an Indiana case in which the statements were
given to a police officer at the suspected crime scene.75 Once again, Justice Scalia
wrote for the majority. As he commented, the facts of these two cases "require[d]
[the Court] to determine more precisely" the meaning of "testimonial" hearsay.76
In Davis, Michelle McCottry placed a 911 call. In sentences using primarily
present tense verbs, she explained that Adrian Davis, her boyfriend, was "jumpin'
on' 77 her and "usin' his fists. '78 She added that Davis had "just r[un] out the
door. ' 79 Michelle's statements were admitted at Adrian's trial for violation of a
domestic no-contact order. The Supreme Court ruled that McCottry's statements
were nontestimonial and thus admissible without violating the Confrontation
Clause."°
In Hammon, the police responded to a "reported domestic disturbance at the
home of Hershel and Amy Hammon."'" When they arrived, Amy initially denied
that there was anything wrong.8" The police, however, noticed that the glass front
of a heater in the living room was broken and that there were flames emitting from
the heater.8 3 An officer then questioned Amy outside Hershel's presence.84 During

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 51 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at51-52.
Id. at 68.
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
Davis, 547 U.S. 817-18.
Id. at 819-21.
Id. at 822.
Id. at 817.
Id.
Id. at 818 (alteration in original).
Id. at 828.
Id. at 819 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 820.
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the questioning, in sentences using primarily past tense verbs, she stated that
Hershel had "[b]roke" the heater and then "shoved me down on the floor into the
broken glass. 8 5 She also asserted that he had "[h]it" me, "[tiore up my van," and
"[a]ttacked my daughter., 8 6 After hearing these statements, the officer had Amy
sign "a battery affidavit"8 7 reflecting that Hershel had committed these acts. Amy's
statements and the affidavit were received into evidence at Hershel's trial for
domestic battery. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the statements were
testimonial, and that their introduction amounted to constitutional error. 8
Justice Scalia discussed the distinction between the statements in the two cases.
He elaborated on Crawford:
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable
statements-or even all conceivable statements in response to police
interrogation-as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the
present cases to hold as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively
indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose
of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution. 9
The Justice asserted that given this standard, the difference between the two
cases was "apparent." 90 In her statements, Michelle McCottry "was speaking about
events as they were actually happening." 91 She was frantically 92 making "a call for
help."93 "No 'witness' goes into court to proclaim an emergency and seek help."94
However, just as Sylvia Crawford described events that had occurred "hours"
before,95 Amy Hammon' s "narrative of past events was delivered at some remove
in time from the danger she described., 96 Amy's statements "were neither a cry for
help nor the provision of information enabling officers immediately to end a
threatening situation. 97

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 834.

89. Id. at 813-14.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 827.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 828.

95. Id. at 817.

96. Id. at 832.
97. Id.
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C. Whorton v. Bockting (2007)
The third decision in this line of authority is Whorton v. Bockting,9 8 rendered in
early 2007. Whorton presented the question of the retroactivity of the Crawford
decision. More precisely, the issue was whether Crawford applies to cases that
became final on direct review before the rendition of the Crawford decision.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Alito answered the question in the
negative. 99
At the beginning of his opinion, Justice Alito cited the leading Supreme Court
precedent on retroactivity, Teague v. Lane.'" Justice Alito stated that under Teague,
a new precedent deserves retroactive application if the precedent banned a practice
that "implicat[es] the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal
proceeding."' 0 ' Additionally, the practice in question must pose "an 'impermissibly
large risk' of an inaccurate conviction."' 2 Justice Alito concluded by stating that
Crawforddoes not meet this criterion:
To be sure, the Crawford rule reflects the Framers' preferred mechanism (crossexamination) for ensuring that inaccurate out-of-court testimonial statements are
not used to convict an accused. But in order for a new rule to meet the accuracy
requirement..., "[i]t is.. .not enough.. .to say that [the] rule is aimed at improving
the accuracy of trial"...or that the rule "is directed toward the enhancement of
reliability and accuracy in some sense."'0 3
Justice Alito reaffirmed that after Crawford, reliability is no longer the end-all
and be-all of the Confrontation Clause. Justice Alito explained that Crawford is
likely to have a mixed effect. While Crawforderects a higher barrier against the
admission of inaccurate testimonial statements, it eliminates constitutional protection "against the admission of unreliable out-of-court nontestimonial statements.""
For that reason, it was "unclear" to Justice Alito whether "on the whole" Crawford
"decreased or increased the number of unreliable out-of-court statements that may
be admitted in criminal trials."10 5
D. State v. March (2007)
Like the Supreme Court's Whorton decision, the Missouri Supreme Court's
decision was handed down in early 2007.'06 In March, the court addressed the
question of whether a crime laboratory report prepared for the prosecution is a
testimonial statement under Crawford. In a 1972 decision, State v. Taylor, the
Missouri Supreme Court had held that a reliable crime laboratory report was an

98. 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007).
99. Id.
100. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
101. Whorton, 127 S. Ct. at 1180.
102. Id. at 1182 (citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 356 (2004)).
103. Id. (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, 243 (1990)).
104. Id. at 1183.
105. Id.
106. State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663 (Mo. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3023 (Oct. 5, 2007)
(No. 06-1699).
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admissible business record in a criminal trial."°7 In March, the Missouri court
asserted that that prior holding was defensible under Roberts.' 8 However, in Judge
Russell's words, "Crawforddivorcedthe hearsay exceptions from the Confrontation
Clause analysis."'" She then opined that post-Crawfordcases in otherjurisdictions
upholding the result reached in Taylor "incorrectly focus on the reliability of such
reports. The reliability of the reports, once paramount under Roberts, is now
irrelevant."110
Judge Russell proceeded to analyze whether a crime laboratory report should be
deemed testimonial under the Crawford line of Supreme Court authority. She
stressed that the report was "prepared at the request of law enforcement for March's
prosecution," the contents of the report were "offered to prove an element of the
charged crime," and the report took the form of a "formal statement offered in lieu
of testimony" by the laboratory technician."' To Judge Russell's mind, Davis
required that the report be characterized as testimonial. She argued that the report
fell squarely within the language of the Davis opinion, noting that "a statement
made in response to police interrogation is testimonial when its 'primary purpose'
is not to respond to an ongoing emergency but 'to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." "12
The State of Missouri sought review of the Missouri Supreme Court's decision.
Ultimately, on October 5, 2007, the United States Supreme Court dismissed
certiorari in the case. 113 Although the March opinion undoubtedly put the Court on
notice that the lower courts are divided over the question, the Supreme Court
refused to intervene to resolve the split of authority.
II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE SPLIT OF AUTHORITY OVER THE
APPLICATION OF THE CRA WFORD LINE OF AUTHORITY TO CRIME
LABORATORY REPORTS
There is now a sharp, three-way split of authority over the question of whether
Crawford bars the prosecutorial use of police laboratory reports. A number of
jurisdictions have addressed the question and acknowledged the division of
sentiment among the courts. 1 4 One court went on to describe the split as
"significant.""' 5
At one end of the spectrum are decisions such as March, which have treated
Crawfordas a constitutional barrier to the introduction of crime laboratory reports.

107. 486 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1972), abrogatedby State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).
108. March, 216 S.W.3d at 665.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 665-66.
111. Id. at 666.
112. Id. (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)).
113. State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663 (Mo. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3023 (Oct. 5, 2007)
(No. 06-1699).
114. State v. Laturner, 163 P.3d 367,374 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) ("There is a significant split between various
courts in the various states on the testimonial nature of these lab reports...."); March, 216 S.W.3d at 665-66 n.1
(Mo. 2007); State v. O'Maley, 932 A.2d 1, 10, 15 (N.H. 2007) (disagreement between thejustices, noting the split
of authority); State v. Crager, 879 N.E.2d 745 (Ohio 2007).
115. Laturner, 163 P.3d at 374.
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These decisions include jurisdictions such as Colorado," 6 the District of
Columbia,1 17 Florida, 1 8 Kansas," 9 Michigan, t20 Minnesota,' Missouri, 122 New
Jersey, 23 New York, 24 Ohio, 25 and Oregon.' 26 The March string of decisions all
rely on essentially the identical, simple argument that the admission of such reports
offends the Confrontation Clause, as construed in Crawford.The starting point of
the argument is the observation that the police are the ones who request that their
crime laboratory colleagues conduct the test. 27 Given the nature and source of the
request, the technician knows that the test is being conducted to generate evidence
that can be used in a prosecution. 28 The very purpose for the preparation of the
report is the creation of evidence for litigation, 29 whether it be plea bargaining or
trial. 3 0 This line of argument is both straightforward and sensible.
For its part, Maryland has staked out a position in the middle of the spectrum.
The Maryland Court of Appeals did so in the Rollins decision, which involved an
autopsy report prepared by a medical examiner's office.' 3 ' In examining the autopsy
report, the court, while referring to People v. Durio,3 2 first noted that the medical
examiner's office "is not a law enforcement agency and is... not subject to the
control of the office of the prosecutor."'' 33 Even then, according to the court, only
34
some passages in an autopsy report may be classified as nontestimonial.'
Essentially "descriptive"'' 35 passages reflecting "objectively observed findings"'36
are nontestimonial. In particular, the examiner's findings that there were "fresh"
bruises and that the victim's corneas were "cloudy" were sufficiently objective to

116. Hinojos-Mendoza v. State, 169 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2007).
117. Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1 (D.C. 2006).
118. State v. Johnson, 982 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 2008).
119. Laturner, 163 P.3d 367.
120. People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d 610 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
121. State v. Johnson, 756 N.W.2d 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304 (Minn.
2006).
122. State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663 (Mo. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3023 (Oct. 5, 2007)
(No. 06-1699).
123. State v. Renshaw, 915 A.2d 1081 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007); State v. Berezansky, 899 A.2d 306
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006), cert. granted,923 A.2d 231 (N.J. 2007).
124. People v. Hernandez, 794 N.Y.S.2d 788 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393
(N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
125. State v. Crager, 844 N.E.2d 390 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), rev'd, 879 N.E.2d 745 (Ohio 2007).
126. State v. Miller, 144 P.3d 1052 (Or. Ct. App. 2006).
127. State v. Laturner, 163 P.3d 367,375 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007); State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663,666 (Mo.
2007) (en banc), cert. denied,76 U.S.L.W. 3023 (Oct. 5,2007) (No. 06-1699) ("The laboratory report was prepared
at the request of law enforcement.").
128. Laturner, 163 P.3d at 376 (The expert "knew when preparing her report that it would be used by the
State at Laturner's trial to prove that he committed the crime.").
129. Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 13 (D.C. 2006); State v. Renshaw, 915 A.2d 1081, 1088 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). See also Thomas F. Burke I1, The Test Results Said What? The Post-Crawford
Admissibility of Hearsay ForensicEvidence, 53 S.D. L. Rev. 1 (2008).
130. John M. Spires, Note, Testimonial or Nontestimonial? The Admissibility of ForensicEvidence After
Crawford v. Washington, 94 KY. L.J. 187, 207 (2005-06).
131. Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821 (Md. 2006).
132. 794 N.Y.S.2d 863 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
133. Rollins, 897 A.2d at 832 (quoting People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 868-69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005)).
134. Id. at 839.
135. Id. at 840.
136. Id.
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qualify for admission. However, "subjective"' 137 or "analytical"' 138 "opinions,
speculations, or conclusions"' 39 must be redacted as testimonial. The court added
that a psychiatric diagnosis would have to be classified as testimonial, since
"psychiatry is not an exact science and.. .opinions as to mental condition vary
140
widely."'
The last view is at the other polar extreme and has attracted judicial adherents
in the federal ranks' 4 ' and states such as California,' 42 Massachusetts,' 43 New
Hampshire,' North Carolina,'45 and Pennsylvania.'4 6 In addition, some of the most
recent decisions adopt this view. 4 7 As previously stated, the opinions extending
Crawford to crime laboratory reports tend to rely on some variation of the
straightforward argument described above. In contrast, the opinions holding
Crawford inapplicable invoke multiple grounds for doing so. In many cases those
grounds essentially resurrect the theories for rejecting the previous common-law
and statutory attacks on the admissibility of crime laboratory reports. Part III both
surveys and critiques those arguments.
III. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE QUESTION OF WHETHER
CRIME LABORATORY REPORTS ARE "TESTIMONIAL"
STATEMENTS UNDER CRAWFORD
As Part 11 noted, courts refusing to apply Crawfordto police laboratory reports
have advanced a variety of alternative arguments to justify their refusal. At the risk
of oversimplification, these arguments relate to the type of report; the kind of
statement in the report; the type of declarant, cross-examination policy; and the
practical impact of a contrary ruling.
A. The Type of Report
Argument 1: Crime laboratoryreportsare exemptfrom scrutinyunder Crawford
because they are business records.In Crawford,Justice Scalia stated that "by their
nature," some statements-"for example, business records"-are not testimonial.' 48

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 834.
Id. at 841, 845-46.
Id. at 834, 839.
Id. at 842 (citations omitted). One New York court has developed another compromise view. See People

v. Rawlins, 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 1420 (Ct. App. Feb 19, 2008) (holding that an expert report may be testimonial

if the findings in effect accuse a defendant of wrongdoing, as when the report matches crime scene fingerprints to
those of the defendant).
141. United States v. Richardson, 537 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225
(4th Cir. 2007),petitionforcert.filed(Dec. 14, 2007) (No. 07-8291); United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1323 (2007).
142. People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007), petitionfor cert. filed (Nov. 14, 2007) (No. 07-7770).
143. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2005).
144. State v. O'Maley, 932 A.2d 1 (N.H. 2007), petitionfor cert. filed (Nov. 7, 2007) (No. 07-7577).
145. State v. Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137 (N.C. 2006), cert. denied,Forte v. North Carolina, 127 S. Ct. 557 (Nov.
6, 2006) (No. 06-6282).
146. Commonwealth v. Carter, 932 A.2d 1261 (Pa. 2007).
147. People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007); Carter,923 A.2d 1261.
148. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004).
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Some courts have seized on that statement 14 and treated it as a basis for automatically exempting from Crawford any document falling within the ambit of the
business entry hearsay exception.15 °
Despite the reliance on this argument, the rationale is flawed. To begin with, the
scope of the business entry exception does not apply to litigation documents.
Admittedly, that limitation emerged before the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The Supreme Court fashioned that limitation in the leading 1943 case of
Palmerv. Hoffman.'5 ' Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) codifies a statutory version
of the business entry exception.'52 Although the text of Rule 803(6) does not
expressly exclude litigation reports from the scope of the exception, the
accompanying Advisory Committee Note approvingly cites Palmer.'53
In Palmer, an accident at a railroad crossing triggered an action against the
railroad's trustees. Two days after the accident, a railroad representative interviewed the train engineer. The engineer signed a statement setting out his version
of the accident. At trial, the railroad offered the statement as a business entry
because it was the railroad's regular practice to solicit such statements from
employees involved in accidents. The Supreme Court held that the statement was
inadmissible, explaining that "[t]heir primary utility is in litigating, not in
railroading."' 54 When a crime laboratory technician prepares a report at the request
of the investigating officers or the prosecutors, the technician is not generating the
report for the internal administration of the police department as a business entity.
Nor is the technician creating a property accountability inventory of the chemicals
in the laboratory storage cabinets. Rather, like the engineer in Palmer, the
technician knows good and well that the primary use of his or her report will be in
plea bargaining or at trial-in other words, in litigation.
More fundamentally, though, this argument misconceives the mandate of
Crawford.'5 5 It is true that Justice Scalia, in the passage cited by courts refusing to
extend Crawford to business entries, refers to the "nature" of business entries.
However, on balance, Crawford should be construed as requiring the trial court to
eschew reliance on categorical hearsay exceptions and instead focus ad hoc on the
circumstances surrounding the specific statement. In footnote six of his opinion, the
Justice remarks that "many" dying declarations are not testimonial.' 56 Again, in
footnote seven the Justice asserts that the risk of prosecutorial abuse "does not
evaporate when testimony happens to fall within some broad, modern hearsay
exception, even if that exception might be justifiable in other circumstances."' 5 7

149. Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 831 (Md. 2006). The most recent decision in this line of authority is
United States v. Morgan, 505 F.3d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 2007).
150. Rollins, 897 A.2d at 831.
151. 318 U.S. 109 (1943). See also 2 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 288, at 310-12 (6th ed. 2006);
lmwinkelried, supra note 9, at 628.
152. FED. R. EviD. 803(6).
153. Id. advisory committee's note. See CSI Inv. Partners II, L.P. v. Cendant Corp., 507 F. Supp. 2d 384,
419-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
154. Palmer,318 U.S. at 114.
155. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Treatment ofProsecutionHearsayUnderCrawford v. washington: Some
Good News, But..., THE CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 18; Spires, supra note 130, at 198-99.
156. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).
157. Id. at 56-57 n.7.
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Tellingly, in Crawford, Davis, and Hammon the Court went to the length of
examining the specific circumstances surrounding the particular statements
introduced against the accused. In none of those cases was the Court content to
generalize that present sense impressions, excited utterances, or declarations against
interest are "always" or "never" testimonial. The Court's mode of analysis in all
those cases undermines the contention that as business entries, crime laboratory
reports are categorically exempt from Crawford scrutiny.
B. The Type of Statement
The next cluster of arguments relates to the nature of the specific statement rather
than the general character of the report. These arguments claim that Crawfordis
inapplicable to a passage in a crime laboratory report if the passage records facts
contemporaneously observed by the technician or "neutral" or "objective" facts.
None of these arguments, however, is able to withstand closer scrutiny.
Argument 2: A statement in a crime laboratory report is nontestimonial if it
recordsfacts contemporaneouslyobserved by the technician.In its decision on this
issue, People v. Geier,' s the California Supreme Court relied heavily on the
argument that a crime laboratory report represents the "contemporaneous"
recordation of the facts observed during the forensic analysis.159 The court pointed
out that in Davis, the United States Supreme Court had stressed that Michelle
McCottry used present tense verbs in her 911 call to describe events that were then
in progress.' The court reasoned that like Ms. McCottry's statements, crime
laboratory reports recording contemporaneous observations are nontestimonial.' 6 1
This argument suffers from several fallacies.
First, the argument reflects a misunderstanding of the operation of crime
laboratories. In this author's experience, the report itself is rarely prepared at the
time of the analysis. During the analysis at the laboratory bench, the technician
records observations in a notebook. The formal report is prepared later-which is
precisely why the prosecutor offers the report under the business entry exception
rather than as a present sense impression.' 62 Research reveals no case in which any
federal or state court has upheld the introduction of a crime laboratory report under
the latter exception.
Second, it is misguided to accord talismanic significance to the tense of the
verb.'6 3 The California Supreme Court's reading of Davis is facile. The Davis court
did not sustain the admission of Ms. McCottry's statements simply because they
were cast in the present tense. It is true that the Court devoted an entire paragraph
to the careful, facial analysis of her statements. That paragraph noted that
"McCottry was speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than

158. 161 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007).
159. Id. at 139-40.
160. Id. at 139.
161. Id. at 140.
162. FED. R. EviD. 803(1).
163. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214,214 (N.Y. 1917) ("The law has outgrown its primitive
stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman.").
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'describing past events."" 64 However, the Geier court takes that paragraph out of
context. The very first sentence of the next paragraph of Davis begins, "We
conclude from.. .this that the circumstances of McCottry's interrogation objectively
indicate that its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency."' 65 The purpose of the statement is dispositive, and the verb tense is
merely evidentiary.
Other courts have had the good sense to reject Geier's simplistic interpretation
of Davis. The Washington Supreme Court, for example, has ruled that a victim's
statement is not automatically testimonial simply because the victim used past tense
verbs. 166 Even when a victim is attempting to verbalize a current emergency, the
victim may still have to resort to a past tense verb. Notably, even in her nontesti167
monial statement, Michelle McCottry employed at least one past tense verb.
Thus, the victim's purpose in making a statement, not the specific verb tense of that
statement, is controlling.
Conversely, it is wrong-minded to treat a statement as nontestimonial merely
because the declarant used present tense verbs. Any realistic court would say that
an informant's statement to the police is likely to be testimonial.168 Suppose that just
as Ms. McCottry placed a call to the 911 dispatcher, an informant calls the police
department to calmly describe a drug sale that he claims to be observing from a safe
vantage point across the street. Unlike Ms. McCottry, however, the informant is not
making a plea for assistance. Rather, the informant may be attempting to provide
evidence that she hopes may lead to either a financial reward or a more favorable
disposition of charges she then has pending. It would be absurd to characterize the
informant's statements as nontestimonial merely because of the verb tense she uses.
Indeed, if the informant is savvy, the informant may realize that her use of present
tense verbs is more likely to render her statements admissible-as present sense
impressions qualifying under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1).169 If the statements
in Crawfordand Hammon must be classified as testimonial because the declarant
should have objectively realized that they well might be put to evidentiary use, the
informant's statements must be categorized as testimonial-even if every verb
coming out of the informant's mouth is in the present tense.
Argument 3: A statement in a crime laboratory report about the result of a
forensic test is nontestimonial because it is "neutral." This is one of the more
curious grounds for overruling Crawford objections to the introduction of crime
laboratory reports, and it is one of the theories that have been recycled from the
prior case law rejecting the common-law and statutory challenges to the admission
of such reports. The cases brushing aside the common-law hearsay attack sometimes

164. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006).
165. Id. at 828.
166. See State v. Ohlson, 168 P.3d 1273 (Wash. 2007).
167. Davis, 547 U.S. at 818 (the accused had "r[un] out the door").
168. See United States v. Powers, 500 F.3d 500, 508 (6th Cir. 2007).
169. FED.R. EvD. 803(1). Some courts would exclude the statement if the witness were the police officer
who received the call but did not observe the drug sale. Some courts have added a percipient witness restriction
as a gloss on the statute. 1EDWARDJ. IMWINKELRIED ETAL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1202, at 462-63
(4th ed. 2007).
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asserted that the analyst's determination was "intrinsically neutral."' 170 If the drug
analyst finds that the unknown is cocaine, the finding is inculpatory, but if she finds
that it is a lawful compound, the finding is exculpatory.' 7' During the second wave
of cases in which defense counsel relied on statutory attacks, once again the courts
occasionally rejected the attack for the stated reason that the analyst's finding was
intrinsically neutral. 172 The courts elaborated that the report was not the product of
an adversarial confrontation between the accused and the police. 173 "This is like
d6jA vu all over again" because today the identical argument is being urged as a
ground for refusing to extend Crawfordto crime laboratory reports. 174 The courts
utilize language that echoes the earlier decisions. For instance, in Geier, the
California Supreme Court declared that the statement is "neutral"' 175 in character
because the result might be exculpatory.7 7 Like the courts rejecting the statutory
attacks on the introduction of crime laboratory reports, the California court
described such reports as the product of a "non-adversary process."' 177 For its part,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
78 added that the expert's finding could lead to a
decision not to prosecute at all.
While this language is familiar, it is unpersuasive. To analyze the argument, we
must first clarify which fact is being referred to-the fact mentioned at trial, the fact
previously reported, or the fact observed still earlier.
1. The Fact Mentioned at Trial
If a laboratory report introduced at trial states that the unknown was cocaine, it
cannot be seriously contended that the fact itself is "neutral." A fact is neutral if it
is equally consistent with two sides in a dispute. 179 In this setting, the fact is not
neutral by any stretch of the imagination. The prosecution would not offer evidence
of the fact at trial-and there would be no occasion for a Crawford objectionunless the prosecution thought that the evidence was not neutral. At this point in the
chronology, the prosecution offers the evidence-and the defense objects-because
the evidence is inculpatory and tends to prove an essential element of the crime for
which the accused is standing trial.8 0
2. The Fact Reported
Not only is the fact not neutral at the time that the report is offered at trial, but
the fact is not even neutral when the report is prepared. Even by that earlier point

170. Irnwinkelried, supra note 9, at 629 (citing United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 582,45 C.M.R. 353,
356 (1972)).
171. Id. See also State v. Crager, 879 N.E.2d 745,754 (Ohio 2007) (the testing is not intended to arrive at
a predetermined result).

172. Gianneli, supra note 3, at 679.
173. Id. at 678-79 (citing United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1979)).
174. Spires, supranote 129, at 202-03.
175. People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 140 (Cal. 2007).

176. Id.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Commonwealth v. Carter, 932 A.2d 1261, 1268 (Pa. 2007).
See WEBsTER'S NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 795 (1991).
FED. R. EviD. 401.
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in the timeline, the accused has almost always been either arrested or both arrested
and charged. If the report states that the unknown is cocaine, that statement tends
to prove an element of the pending charge, and it makes it more probable that there
will be litigation-either plea bargaining or trial.
3. The Fact Observed
Perhaps, though, the courts relying on this argument mean that the fact is neutral
when it was originally observed. At that point in time, the observer does not know
whether the fact will later prove to be incriminating or exculpatory. However, even
that limited meaning of "neutral" cannot pass muster under Crawford,Davis, and
Hammon. Neutrality in that sense is insufficient to exempt a statement from the
scope of Crawford.
As previously stated, while the Davis Court characterized Michelle McCottry' s
statements to the 911 operator as nontestimonial, the Court ruled that Amy
Hammon' s statements to the investigating police officer were testimonial. The latter
ruling included her statements explaining why there was broken glass on the floor.
Suppose that Ms. Hammon had added that she had earlier locked Hershel out of the
house and that some of the glass on the floor was due to the fact that he used a
hammer to smash a window to reenter the house. There cannot be any doubt that the
Court would have characterized that statement as just as testimonial as her other
statements about the incident. The Court would have classified the statement in that
fashion even though Amy, the alleged victim, had no testimonial motivation when
she initially observed Hershel breaking the glass window.
Assume now that Amy is not the alleged victim. Rather, Amy Hammon is a crime
laboratory expert specializing in the analysis of glass fractures.' 8 ' As in the
preceding paragraph, the victim told the police that the assailant shattered a window
to enter the house. At the scene, the police collect glass fragments as trace evidence
and ask Amy the expert to evaluate the fractures in the fragments to determine
whether they are consistent with the hypothesis that the window was shattered by
a hammer.' 82 If the statement of Amy the victim about the glass fracture would have
to be deemed testimonial, the statement by Amy the expert is also testimonial. The
statement of Amy the victim is testimonial even though, when she earlier observed
Hershel break the window, it might not have occurred to her that she would later
have to testify about that fact. The difference between Amy the victim and Amy the
expert is that when Amy the expert makes her observations about the nature of the
fractures in the glass fragments, she knows that her statement may well be put to
testimonial use. If the statement by Amy the victim is testimonial, a fortiori the
statement by Amy the expert ought to be classified in the same manner.
Argument 4: A statement in a crime laboratory report about the result of a
forensic test is nontestimonialif the statementrecordsa relatively objectivefinding
rather than an opinionated conclusion. This theory is another argument that the

181. 2 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 27, § 24.08.
182. Id.
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courts employed as a basis for rejecting the earlier common-law" 3 and statutory 1""
attacks on the admissibility of crime laboratory reports. The same argument has
become one of the most popular grounds for overruling Crawfordobjections to the
introduction of such reports. In a given case, a court relying on this theory is likely
to reason that although the expert's finding is technically an expert opinion, the
finding is largely "descriptive"' 8 5 and "objective."' 6 For example, the Maryland
court held that a medical examiner's findings as to "fresh" bruises and "cloudy"
corneas were essentially factual, objective observations. 8 7 Those findings are
neither recitations of fact"' nor opinions s9 that a layperson would be entitled to
testify to, but the court considered the findings to be so objective and trustworthy
These courts distinguish
that the court treated them as factual testimony.
"analytical"' conclusions and speculations.' 9' Thus, the same Maryland court
required the redaction of the medical examiner's opinions as to cause and manner
of death. 9 2 In dictum, the court added that it would treat a mental diagnosis in the
same manner and generally require the expert's personal appearance for crossexamination.' 93
There is certainly an element of truth in this argument. One court declared that
Crawfordought not to reach "raw data" produced by scientific instrumentation.' 94
If the court meant that Crawfordshould not extend to computer-generated data such
as the printout of a breathalyzer instrument, the court is correct:
Distinguish between computer-generated statements and printouts of human
statements stored in computers. The former are not hearsay because the
computer is not a person capable of being cross-examined. To be sure, there is
a scientific evidence problem. The proponent must establish the validity of the
computer program that generated the statement. For example, the proponent may
have to lay a Daubert95 foundation for the formula embedded in the software or

demonstrate that the validity of the formulae is judicially noticeable under
[Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 201. However, there is no hearsay objection when
the statement is generated by an instrument.' 96

183. Imwinkeiried, supra note 9, at 627, 638-40.
184. Giannelli, supra note 3, at 679.
185. Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 841 (Md. 2006). See Comment, Towarda Definition of "Testimonial":
How Autopsy Reports Do Not Embody the Qualitiesof a Testimonial Statement, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1093 (2008).

186. State v. Latumer, 163 P.3d 367, 375 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007); Commonwealth v. Carter, 932 A.2d 1261,
1268 (Pa. 2007).
187. Rollins, 897 A.2d at 840-41. See also People v. Salinas, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 302, 304,306 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007), depublished by People v. Salinas, 154 P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2007) (finding that the unknown substance was
methamphetamine should not be deemed opinion evidence; the finding was so factual in nature that the finding
was not testimonial); Laturner, 163 P.3d at 375 ("nontestimonial objective facts").
188. FED. R. EvID. 602.
189. FED. R. Evim. 701.

190. Rollins, 897 A.2d at 841-42; Laturner, 163 P.3d at 375.
191. Rollins, 897 A.2d at 840-41.

192. Id. at 827.
193.

Id. at 842.

194. Laturner, 163 P.3d at 376.
195. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (construing FED. R. EVIlD. 702).
196.

IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supranote 169, § 1005, at 405-06.
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However, when the statement is made by a human declarant such as a forensic
expert, the courts' reliance on the supposed objectivity of the findings as a
justification for exempting the finding from Crawfordis frequently misplaced. In
the first place, the courts tend to underestimate the element of subjectivity in
forensic analysis. In a 2007 decision, a California intermediate appellate court ruled
that a statement that an unknown substance was methamphetamine was an
objective, factual determination, "not opinion evidence."' 97 While the opinion
indicates that there was evidence that the analyst had run some "tests,"' 9 8 the
opinion does not specify the tests. A myriad of drug testing procedures exists 99 and
there is a considerable element of subjectivity in the interpretation of the results of
some procedures, such as morphological tests 2 u and color change tests. 20' Similarly,
there is a good deal of room for interpretation when a crime laboratory analyst is
relying on microscopic comparison to determine whether there is20 3a "match"
24
2°
between crime scene samples and trace evidence such as hair, fiber, and soil
associated with an accused. For that matter, there is inherent subjectivity in match
determinations in fingerprint examination.2 5 In the initial Llera Plaza decision in
early 2002, Judge Pollak was struck by the lack of objectivity in fingerprint
analysis.20 6 As his opinion indicates, "there is no agreement" on the number of
points of similarity required "to declare a match" and no population frequency data
as to the occurrence of particular types of fingerprint details. 0 7 In that decision,
Judge Pollak barred all opinion testimony on the question of whether a fingerprint
impression is attributable to a certain person's finger. Concededly, in his later
decision in the case, Judge Pollak reversed himself and ruled opinion testimony
admissible. 20 8 However, he did so only after his review of other federal expert
testimony decisions convinced him that other courts routinely accept expert
opinions that rest on subjective "ingredients" and interpretation. 2 9
More fundamentally, this argument misses the point of Crawford.The argument
hit the mark during the previous common-law and statutory attacks because the
essential thrust of those attacks was that these scientific findings are of suspect

197. People v. Salinas, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 302, 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), depublished by People v. Salinas,
154 P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2007).
198. Id.
199. See generally 2 G[ANNELL & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 27, § 23.
200. Id. § 23.02[a].
201. Id. § 23.02[b].
202. Id. § 24.02.
203. Id. § 24.04.
204. Id. § 24.11.
205. Id. §§ 16.07, 16.10[d]. See also Cooley, supra note 5, at 353, 369-71.
206. United States v. Lera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (withdrawn). See also James E. Starrs,
FingerprintingDenied Its Day in Maryland TrialCourt, 31 SCI. SLEUTHING REV. Fall 2007, at 1, 3 (In a pretrial
hearing in State v. Rose (K06-545 Cir. Ct. Baltimore, Md. 2007), Circuit Court Judge Susan Souder excluded
fingerprint opinion testimony. She rejected the prosecution expert's claim that there are "objective universal
standards that govern" fingerprint examination and concluded that the procedure is "subjective" in nature. Judge
Souder noted that even the prosecution expert conceded that "the individualization is left up to each individual
examiner.").
207. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 517; but see United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 550-52
(E.D. Pa. 2002).
208. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549.
209. Id. at 575-76.
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reliability. The common law developed the restrictions on opinion testimony in
large part because it embraced the premise that factual testimony is more reliable
than opinionated evidence.2t ° However, after Crawford,reliability is no longer the
litmus test for the admissibility of prosecution hearsay. A moment's reflection on
the facts in Crawfordand Davis exposes this argument as inapposite. In Crawford,
the Court excluded Sylvia's statements even though they were factual in nature.
Similarly, in the Hammon case joined with Davis, the Court held that Amy's
statements were testimonial and inadmissible even though they were factual in
character. There is no language in the Supreme Court's decisions even faintly
suggesting that a statement is immune from Crawfordanalysis simply because it is
factual rather than opinionated.
C. The Type of Declarant
Argument 5: A finding by an analyst in a crime laboratory report is
nontestimonial because the analyst is primarilyan impartialscientist rather than
a potentially biasedpolice officer.
In the cases rejecting the common-law21 ' and statutory212 attacks on crime
laboratory reports, the courts frequently resorted to the argument that the analyst
viewed himself or herself primarily as a scientist rather than an advocate for the
police. The same argument is now surfacing in opinions overruling Crawford
objections to the introduction of such reports." 3 However, Crawford robs that
argument of its validity.
As previously stated, it seems clear that Crawfordwould apply to a statement by
an informant observing a crime and reporting the observations to the police.2" 4
Assume that during the report of a drug transaction, the informant states that he or
she is an experienced methamphetamine user and recognizes the drug the accused
just handed to the buyer as methamphetamine. If the informant appeared as a
witness at trial, the informant's extensive experience with the drug well might
qualify the informant to give opinion testimony that the drug was methamphetamine.21 5 Despite the potential admissibility of the statement at trial under the
opinion rules, the statement should be characterized as testimonial for Crawford
purposes. Again, if the informant is describing the transaction from a safe vantage
point, the informant is not describing an ongoing emergency she is experiencing;
rather, in the statement she is providing information that she realizes may be of use
to the police in a prosecution.
Compare that to a statement by a police chemist finding that an unknown
substance is methamphetamine. While it is true that the chemist's finding may be

210.

See CARLSON, bWINKLRIED, KONKA& STRACHAN, supranote 19, at Ch. 23; see also Dale A. Nance,

The Best Evidence Principle,73 IOWA L. REV. 227 (1988).
211. Imwinkelhied, supra note 9, at 629.
212. Giannelli, supra note 3, at 680-81.
213. See, e.g., Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 832 (Md. 2006).
214. United States v. Powers, 500 F.3d 500 (6th Cir. 2007).
215. See 2 GiANNELLt & IMWlNKELRD, supra note 27, § 23.05, at 547-48 n.212 (citing, inter alia, State
v. Yelton, 623 S.E.2d 594 (N.C. App. 2006); Michael D. Blanchard & Gabriel Chin, Identifying the Enemy in the
War on Drugs:A Critique of the Developing Rule Permitting Visual Identification of Indescript White Powder
in NarcoticsProsecutions,47 AM. U. L. REv. 557, 562-65 (1998)).
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more reliable than the informant's opinion, it bears repeating that reliability is no
longer the test. If the informant's statement is testimonial, the chemist's statement
must also be categorized as testimonial.
Depending on the extent of the police control over the informant's activities, the
informant may be a private citizen.216 The police chemist is typically a government
employee, as 80 percent of the crime laboratories in the United States are formally
part of a police department.2 7 In Crawford,the Court stated that the Confrontation
Clause was inspired by the Founding Fathers' concern about the "involvement of
government officers in the production" of evidence.1 8 When a police officer or
prosecutor requests a forensic analysis from a crime laboratory, there are
government employees on both sides of the conversation-the government agent
requesting the analysis and the government agent conducting the analysis. There is
even more government involvement in the production of the statement than there
was in the statements excluded in Crawford and Hammon.
Further, the crime laboratory analyst has more reason to realize that his or her
statement will be put to prosecutorial use. In Crawford and Hammon, the police
posed their questions to Sylvia and Amy before any formal charges had been lodged
against the accused. In the typical scenario in which there is an official request for
a crime laboratory report, charges have been filed.
In addition, the typical crime laboratory analyst, as a trained professional who
may frequently be called to testify, is likely to be more conscious of the evidentiary
requirements than declarants such as Sylvia and Amy. The analyst is far more likely
to produce a statement that satisfies those requirements and can be used as evidence
at trial. This is especially true under the amended version of Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16.219 Under amended Rule 16(a)(1)(G), "[a]t the defendant's
request, the government must give to the defendant a written summary of any
testimony that the government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at trial., 22' The referenced
provisions in the Federal Rules of Evidence are some of the key statutes governing
the admissibility of expert opinion testimony. If the expert has previously prepared
such a report, he or she will be quite familiar with the governing evidentiary
standards. If the expert believes that there is a good possibility that the prosecution
in question will go to trial, the expert will realize that he or she has to prepare a
report that satisfies the evidentiary requirements.
Finally, a close reading of Davis points strongly to the conclusion that Crawford
applies to statements by government agents such as crime laboratory analysts. At
one point, the Davis Court cites Dowdell v. United States,2 2' providing a
parenthetical description of Dowdell: "facts regarding conduct of prior trial certified
to by the judge, the clerk of court, and the official reporter did not relate to

216. See United States v. Pannell, 510 F. Supp. 2d 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
217. Giannelli, supra note 3, at 681. See also Spires, supra note 130, at 195, 207.
218. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,53 (2004); see Richard D. Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way
Beyond, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 553 (2007).
219. FED. R. CRiM.P. 16.
220. Id.
221. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,825 (2006) (citing Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911)).
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defendants' guilt or innocence and hence were not statements of 'witnesses' under
the Confrontation Clause." 222 The Davis Court's language indicates that the Court
considered the statements admissible because the content of the statements "did not
relate to defendants' guilt or innocence. 223 The Court did not state or imply that the
Clause is inapplicable to statements by government agents. In contrast to the
statements in Dowdell, the crime laboratory analyst's statements undeniably "relate
to defendants' guilt or innocence. 224 Indeed, the laboratory report may furnish the
crucial evidence on the pivotal, essential element of the charged offense.
Hence, while the crime laboratory analyst's background may make his or her
findings more reliable than the informant's statement that the substance in the
accused's hand was methamphetamine, the analyst's finding is no less testimonial.
D. Cross-ExaminationPolicy
Argument 6: There is nojustificationforapplying Crawford to crime laboratory
reports because there is little or no utility to requiring the analyst to appearfor
cross-examination.
This is another recycled argument. The courts relied on the same argument as a
basis for fending off the previous common-law 225 and statutory 22 6 attacks on the
introduction of police laboratory reports. In a concurrence in a 1970 Confrontation
Clause decision, 227 "Justice Harlan cited the business and public records exception,
including a case admitting laboratory reports, as examples of hearsay exceptions in
which the production of the declarant would be 'of small utility to a defendant.' "228
The argument runs that in the typical case, it is ordinarily pointless to mandate the
analyst's personal appearance.229 The analyst may have conducted hundreds or
thousands of similar tests, and if the analyst testifies at trial, the analyst may have
no independent recollection of this particular test.230 Consequently, the analyst will
have to rely on the contents of the report. Many lower courts are now resurrecting
this argument as a ground for overruling Crawfordobjections to the introduction
of crime laboratory reports.23'

222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Imwinkelried, supra note 9, at 644.
226. Giannelli, supra note 3, at 695-96.
227. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
228. Giannelli, supra note 3, at 695-96 n.198 (citing Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1958)).
229. Imwinkelried, supra note 9, at 644.
230. Id.
231. People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 134-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) ("[Iheauthor, signator, or custodian of
the document ordinarily would be unable to recall from actual memory information relating to the specific contents
of the writing and would rely instead upon the record of his or her own action." Given the passage of time, "medical
examiners who regularly perform hundreds of autopsies are unlikely to have any independent recollection of the
autopsy at issue in a particular case and in testifying invariably rely entirely on the autopsy report."); People v.
Salinas, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 302, 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), depublishedby People v. Salinas, 154 P.3d 1002 (Cal.
2007) ("It is highly unlikely that Fagundes, the criminalist who actually ran the test, would have testified any
differently. Fagundes would most likely have been required to rely upon the document itself to recount the test
results; it is highly unlikely that he would have an independent recollection of the test performed on this particular
sample."); Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 10 (D.C. 2006) ("the utility of trial confrontation" would be
"remote"); Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821,832 (Md. 2006) ("[Mledical examiners who regularly perform hundreds
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On the one hand, unlike many of the recycled arguments previously discussed,
this argument at least meets the thrust of a Crawford objection. Unlike many of
those arguments, this contention does not rely on the supposed reliability of crime
laboratory reports. Rather, the argument contends that in this context, it does not
serve cross-examination policy to mandate the analyst's appearance. In Whorton v.
Bockting,232 the Supreme Court made it clear that the Crawford line of authority
rests on the premise that cross-examination was "the Framers' preferred
mechanism.. for ensuring that inaccurate out-of-court testimonial statements are not
used to convict an accused. ' 233 If as a practical matter, cross-examination would
serve little purpose in a particular context, it makes little sense to extend Crawford
to that context.
On the other hand, this argument was invalid when it initially surfaced in the
cases adjudicating the common-law and statutory attacks, and it is even weaker
today. Cross-examination will often be profitable in this setting.
First, cross-examination can be useful to explore the specific credentials of the
analyst. 234 Proof that the opposing expert lacks specialized expertise is a wellaccepted method of challenging the weight of the expert's testimony.235 For
example, the cross-examiner can force the expert to concede that although she has
a Bachelor of Science degree in Chemistry, none of the expert's coursework related
to the methodology employed in the instant case. 236 This cross-examination tack can
be potent:
The beauty of this attack is that although you formally impeach the expert, in
reality you are impeaching the opposing attorney. During a trial, jurors make a
decision as to which attorney is the more reliable source of information. The jury
is likely to suspect the opposing attorney's candor if, on the expert's direct
examination, the attorney seemingly attempted to foist largely irrelevant
credentials on the jury.237
After Daubert238-the Supreme Court's celebrated 1993 scientific evidence
decision-this attack is even weightier than it was when the courts were passing on
the common-law and statutory attacks. Before Daubert, the courts often ruled a
witness qualified as an expert so long as he or she was a generalist in the field to
which the opinion relates.239 However, in Daubert and its subsequent scientific
evidence decisions,2' the Supreme Court emphasized that the expert must be

of autopsies are unlikely to have any independent recollection of the autopsy at issue in a particular case.");
Commonwealth v. Carter, 932 A.2d 1261, 1267 (Pa. 2007) ("[C]ross-examining the chemist about the specifics
of one test out of perhaps hundreds of identical tests would have been of little utility;... any testimony regarding
the likelihood of error in the test procedure would have concerned general practices and probabilities in the lab,
about which the lab's manager was qualified to testify.").
232. 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007).
233. Id. at 1182.
234. See Cooley, supra note 5, at 411 (the technician's training may consist solely of short courses rather
than formal educational experiences).

§ 9-11(4th ed. 2004).

235.

EDWARDJ. IMWINKEI.RIED, THEMETHODSOFATrACKING ScmNTFIc EVIDENCE

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. §9-11[b].
Id. §9-1l[b].
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
See Edward J. lmwinkeiried, Expert Witness:An UnheraldedChange, NAT' L.J., Feb. 5, 20 ,at A10.
See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 152-53 (1999); see generally D. Michael
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competent to perform the specific "task at hand, ' 241 that is, to draw the precise
inference that the expert proposes testifying to. As a result of that emphasis, many
lower courts are now more insistent that the witness possess specialized expertise.242
Hence, the opportunity to explore the analyst's specific credentials is more valuable
now than it was previously.
Second, the opportunity to cross-examine the analyst is useful to highlight the
subjectivity of the expert's interpretive standard. 243 Although on direct examination
the expert may purport to be relying on an objective scientific technique, the crossexamination can reveal that in reality the expert has made a subjective evaluation
of the data.2' The jury may well discount the expert's opinion if, during crossexamination, the expert is unable to precisely verbalize the interpretive standard.245
The cross-examination helps thejury appreciate that the standard is experiential and
idiosyncratic, not objective and experimentally validated. In the past, this has been
a favorite prosecution tactic for cross-examining defense psychiatrists and
psychologists.246 What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. In the final
analysis, many findings in crime laboratory reports in such fields as pathology and
firearms identification rest on subjective interpretive standards.2 47 As the courts
begin to realize the extent to which subjectivity pervades interpretive standards in
forensic science, they will see that cross-examination in this context has far more
than the minimal utility claimed by the opponents of applying Crawford to crime
laboratory reports.
Argument 7: Even if there is a needfor cross-examination,that need is satisfied
by the opportunity to question the laboratory supervisor; there is no justification
for mandating the personal appearanceof the specific analyst who preparedthe
crime laboratoryreport.
This argument is closely tied to the previous argument. The courts relying on this
argument point out that in many cases in which the analyst does not appear, the
prosecution calls the laboratory manager24 or the analyst's supervisor 4 9 to lay the
foundation for the admission of the report. These courts reason that the chance to
question that witness about laboratory procedures satisfies cross-examination policy
and obviates any necessity to call the analyst himself or herself. In the words of one
court, the defense counsel has an ample opportunity to question the manager or
supervisor "regarding samples, procedures, safeguards, and results., 25" This "live

Risinger, Defining the "Task at Hand": Non-Science Forensic Science After Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57

WASH. & LEE L.REV. 767 (2000).
241. Risinger, supra note 240.
242. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Early v. Toyota Motor

Corp., 486 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637 (E.D. Ky. 2007); Botnick v. Zimmer, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 715, 719-20 (N.D.
Ohio 2007); 1 McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 13, at 71 (6th ed. 2006); Imwinkehied, supra note 239, at A10.

243. IMWINKELR1ED, supra note 235, § 10-3-5; Imwinkelried, supra note 9, at 645.
244. Giannelli, supranote 3, at 691; see also Cooley, supra note 5, at 353, 369-7 1.
245. Inwinkelried, supra note 9, at 645.

246. Id.
247. Giannelli, supra note 3, at 691.
248. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 932 A.2d 1261, 1262 (Pa. 2007).
249. See People v. Salinas, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 302,304 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), depublishedby People v. Salinas,
154 P.3d 1002 (Cal. 2007).
250. Caner,932 A.2d at 1268 (citing State v. Kennedy, 7 S.W.3d 58 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)).
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in-court testimony... subject to full cross-examination" allows the defense attorney
to probe about "how samples are handled in the laboratory and how the tests are
run."25' This argument, though, suffers from several weaknesses.
Initially, the argument assumes that the prosecution will call a live witness to
establish the foundation. In some jurisdictions, that is unnecessary. In several
jurisdictions, the evidence code permits the prosecution to lay the foundation with
an affidavit or certificate rather than live testimony.252 By way of example, that
result is possible in federal practice. Since the time of their original enactment, the
Federal Rules of Evidence have treated official records as self-authenticating if the
correct types of certificates are attached to the record.253 The Rules were amended
in 2000 to permit the authentication of business records in a similar fashion.25 4
However, even when the laboratory manager or supervisor appears, the
opportunity to question them will often fall short of satisfying the need to crossexamine the analyst. As previously stated, cross-examination challenging the
analyst's specific credentials can be highly useful to the defense. Of course, to some
extent that problem could be solved by requiring that the laboratory attach a copy
of the analyst's detailed r6sum6 to the report.255 However, even that step would not
satisfy the defense's need to expose the subjectivity of the expert's interpretive
standard. In many forensic disciplines, the expert relies on personal, subjective
standards to draw the inference.256 Substituting the appearance by the manager or
supervisor effectively shields those standards from inquiry or challenge.
E. Pragmaticor PracticalConsiderations
Argument 8: Extending Crawford to crime laboratory reports will place an
undue burden on police laboratories.
This is another recycled argument that courts sometimes invoked as the basis for
257
rejecting the common-law attacks on the admissibility of crime laboratory reports.
In the current wave of constitutional attacks, the argument has materialized again.
According to one court, the Confrontation Clause cannot be applied mechanically
without weighing "pragmatic ' or "practical ' 259 considerations. In that court's
view, extending Crawfordto crime laboratory reports will place an undue strain on

251. Salinas, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306.
252. See, e.g., Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 833 (Md. 2006) (citing Florida practice). But see Thomas v.
United States, 914 A.2d 1, 7 (D.C. 2006) (a "Certified Report of Controlled Substance Analysis").
253. FED. R. EviD. 902(1)-(4).
254. Id. 902(11)-(12). See also id. 803(6) (cross-referencing the amendment adding Federal Rules of
Evidence 902(11)-(12)).
255. But see Marcy Ressler Harris, Getting Wise About Rsumu Lies, LITIGATION, Summer 1999, at 21
("Employment experts estimate that one-third of all people with r6sum~s lie on them.").
256. Giannelli, supra note 3, at 691; see also Cooley, supra note 5, at 353, 369-71; Paul C. Giannelli, Bite
Mark Analysis, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 930, 936-37 (2007); Roger Koppl, REASON FOUND. POL'Y STUDY, CSI FOR
REAL: How TO IMPROvE FORENSICS SCIENCE 10 (2007), http://www.reason.org/ps364-forensics.pdf. Experts often
rely on essentially subjective standards to determine whether there is a "match" in the microscopic analysis of trace
evidence such as hair, fiber, and soil. See 2 GIANNELL1 & IMWINKELRiED, supra note 27, §§ 24.02, 24.04, 24.10.
257. Imwinkelried, supra note 9, at 643.
258. State v. Renshaw, 915 A.2d 1081, 1085, 1088 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
259. Id. at 1088.
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the expert professions. 2" In its 2007 decision, Geier,26 1 the California Supreme
Court was similarly impressed by the "practical difficulties"2 6 2 that would result
from an extension of Crawford. The court explained that it refused to issue a
holding carrying "the practical implication[]" that analysts must appear to "testify
in every criminal proceeding., 263 Should this argument carry the day?
For several reasons, the argument is overstated. The thesis of this article is that
Crawfordshould apply to a crime laboratory report conclusion if, in that forensic
discipline, experts customarily rely on subjective interpretive standards. As the
preceding analysis of Argument 4 establishes, the courts should not extend
Crawford to reports that merely document raw data yielded by an instrumental
analysis. Likewise, Crawford is arguably inapplicable if, on its face, the report
shows that the analyst employed an objective decisional criterion such as 'the
"quantitative rule" that "all [DNA] fragments must lie within 2% of one another. '21
Alternatively, the record might establish that the accused had validly waived his or
her right to demand the analyst's appearance.265 If the defense believes that the
prosecution is determined to go to trial and the defense knows that the analyst is a
convincing, effective witness, tactically it would be foolish for the defense not to
waive, since the analyst's live testimony would make the prosecution's case more
persuasive to the jury. Thus, it is exaggerated to sweepingly generalize that analysts
will have to testify in "every" trial.
Quite apart from the possibility of waiver or Crawford'sinapplicability to certain
types of reports, there may be constitutionally permissible procedural solutions
short of requiring that the analyst leave the laboratory and physically appear at
trial.266 Several states have adopted legislation permitting telephonic testimony by
experts.267 In addition, some jurisdictions are now experimenting with two-way
closed circuit television, which "more closely approximates face-to-face confrontation., 26 8 The state of the case law on this issue is admittedly "in flux. ' 2 69 However,
it is by no means a foregone conclusion that the application of Crawfordto crime

260. Id. at 1086 (citing State v. DeFrank, 826 A.2d 773 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003)).
261.

People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 135-36 (Cal. 2007).

262. Id.
263. Id. at 136 (quoting State v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332 (Kan. 2005)).
264. COMM. ONDNATECH. IN FORENSIc SCI., NAT'L RESEARCH CoUNcIL, DNATECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC
SCIENCE 61 (1992).

265. Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 19 (D.C. 2006); State v. Laturner, 163 P.3d 367, 377 (Kan. App.
2007); 1 GIANNELu & IMwiNKELRIED, supra note 27, § 6.04[c], at 381-83.
266. Imwinkehied, supra note 9, at 643-44.
267. See Michael J. Weber,Annotation, Permissibilityof Testimony by Telephone in State Trial, 85 A.L.R.
4th 476 (1991); Jon K. Mandelman, Comment, Telephonic Testimony: Talking with the Experts, 29 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 413,414 (1996).

268. United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1999) (the Craig test is inapplicable to two-way
videoconferencing, which preserves rather than infringes on face-to-face confrontation). See also Hom v.
Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 320 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that testimony via two-way closed-circuit television was
constitutional in light of Craig); Aaron Harmon, Child Testimony via Two-Way Closed CircuitTelevision: A New
Perspective on Maryland v. Craig in United States v. Turning Bear and United States v. Bordeaux, 7 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. 157 (2005); Matthew J. Tokson, Comment, Virtual Confrontation: Is Videoconference Testimony by an
Unavailable Witness Constitutional?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1581 (2007).
269. 1 IMWINKELRIEDETAL.,supra note 169, § 109, at 25.
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laboratory reports will invariably require the analyst to travel to the courthouse to
testify.27 °
There is another, more fundamental rebuttal to Argument 8. This argument is
quite similar to an argument advanced-and squarely rejected by the Supreme
Court-in Davis v. Washington.27' Both cases consolidated in Davis involved
domestic violence. In Part IV of his opinion, Justice Scalia wrote:
Respondents in both cases, joined by a number of their amici, contend that the
nature of the offenses charged in these two cases-domestic violence-requires
greater flexibility in the use of testimonial evidence. This particular type of crime
is notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that
she does not testify at trial. When this occurs, the Confrontation Clause gives the
criminal a windfall. We may not, however, vitiate constitutional guarantees when
they have the effect of allowing the guilty to go free. 2
In one of the leading cases extending Crawford to crime laboratory reports, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals relied on similar reasoning to rebut the
argument that pragmatic considerations preclude the application of Crawford to
these reports. The court stated tersely that "[tihis plea of administrative convenience
...
cannot justify abrogating a defendant's right of confrontation. 273 If the
compelling interest in the prosecution of domestic violence does not trump
Crawford, neither should a plea of administrative burden.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article discusses three bodies of case law: a group of decisions adjudicating
common-law hearsay attacks on the admissibility of crime laboratory reports, a set
of opinions ruling on statutory attacks on the introduction of such reports, and the
latest spate of decisions analyzing constitutional Crawfordobjections to the receipt
of these reports. Any objective reader would be struck by the common denominators
among the three groups of cases. All of them attack the same type of prosecution
evidence. In each set, the numerical majority of the opinions appears to reject the
attack. And, even more surprisingly, in rejecting these disparate attacks, the courts
tend to rely on the very same repertoire of arguments.
In the final analysis, within this repertoire, three of the clusters of arguments
relate to the reliability of the prosecution hearsay. The argument runs that the
general kind of record is trustworthy, the specific passage is reliable, or the type of
declarant is credible. Whatever their weaknesses, these clusters of arguments at
least met the common-law and statutory attacks head-on: The accused pressing
those arguments contended that the crime laboratory report was too unreliable to be
admissible, and the argument countered that for one reason or another, the report
was reliable. As we have seen, each argument suffers from major flaws, but at least
it was a direct parry to the thrust of the earlier attack.

270.
271.
272.
273.

See Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 17 (D.C. 2006).
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
Id.at 832-33.
Thomas, 914 A.2d at 17.

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 38

However, Crawfordhas overtaken those arguments. Those arguments are largely
irrelevant to the new, constitutional objection to the introduction of police
laboratory reports. Crawfordmakes it patent that reliability is no longer the name
of the game under the Confrontation Clause. Thus, while as a general proposition
the factual character of testimony may make it more reliable, the factual nature of
the evidence provides no exemption from Crawford.In both Crawford and Davis,
the Court barred testimony that was factual rather than opinionated. Given the facts
in those cases, it is specious to argue that a finding in a crime laboratory report is
admissible simply because it is so reliable that it approximates factual testimony.
The fourth and fifth clusters of arguments are the only ones that squarely meet
the Crawfordobjection. They represent a constitutional cost-benefit analysis. The
arguments in the fourth cluster minimize the benefit that would result from
extending Crawford to police laboratory reports. These arguments assert that
Crawfordrests on cross-examination policy and that in the typical case, it does not
promote that policy to any significant degree to apply Crawford to these reports.
After all, if called at trial, the analyst is unlikely to remember the specific test
documented in the report, and the defense may cross-examine the laboratory
manager or supervisor to challenge the laboratory's customary procedures and
protocols. As we have seen, these arguments should have been ruled wanting during
the earlier phases of common-law and statutory litigation, and they are even weaker
now. Today the courts are more insistent that to be competent to perform the
specific "task at hand," the witness must possess some specialized expertise
relevant to the conclusion he or she contemplates drawing. In line with this modem
approach, the defense ought to be permitted to question the analyst to expose, for
instance, his or her lack of relevant coursework. Even more importantly, there is a
growing realization that many forensic scientists rely on subjective interpretive
standards to evaluate the facts in the case. Cross-examination is highly useful in
exposing such reliance as a basis for an argument that despite his or her impressive
credentials, the witness's opinion represents ipse dixit. In short, in these situations
there can be meaningful, valuable cross-examination and, hence, there is a
considerable benefit to extending Crawfordto these situations.
The fifth cluster of arguments concerning "pragmatic considerations" relates to
the cost part of the calculus. Here the argument runs that the result of extending
Crawfordwill be untoward: The extension will require the analyst to travel to court
to give live testimony in virtually every trial, and that will cripple already
overburdened crime laboratories. We have seen that the supposed impact of
extending Crawford is exaggerated. In some cases, it may be possible to solicit a
waiver of the Confrontation Clause from the accused; and even when the accused
does not waive, there may be constitutionally permissible substitutes such as twoway closed circuit television for live testimony in court.
Nevertheless, it would be dishonest to deny that the application of Crawford to
police laboratory reports will exact a cost. Some accused will not waive, and the
courts may find the proposed technological substitutes unacceptable. Thus, the
extension of Crawford is likely to impose an added strain on already burdened
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crime laboratories.27 4 Congress and the legislatures may have to provide further
funding for hiring additional crime laboratory staff because staff members will have
to spend more time testifying.
If the extension of Crawfordwill yield genuine benefit but impose real costs, the
question becomes how should the cost-benefit balance be struck. Justice Scalia
answered that question in Davis.27 5 In Davis, he faced a similar argument that the
rigorous application of Crawfordindomestic violence prosecutions would exact too
high a cost, creating an impediment to the effective prosecution of offenders guilty
of that serious offense. Justice Scalia frankly admitted that the application of the
Confrontation Clause does not come cost free.276 However, he concluded that the
Founding Fathers struck the balance by mandating a constitutional preference for
cross-examination of "witnesses against" the accused.277 Crime laboratory analysts
realize that they are functioning as witnesses, generating evidence against accused;
and at least when they employ interpretive standards with a significant element of
subjectivity, their trial cross-examination can be useful and illuminating. Most of
the arguments previously relied on to defeat the common-law and statutory attacks
on the admissibility of police laboratory reports made sense when the crucial issue
was the reliability of the prosecution hearsay. However, those arguments have been
recycled once too often. Given the sea change effected by Crawford,today those
arguments are as flawed as they are familiar.
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